Whether any non-human animal can attribute mental states to others remains the subject of extensive debate. This despite the fact that several species have behaved as if they have a ‘theory of mind’ in various behavioral tasks. In this paper, we review the reasons of skeptics for their doubts: That existing experimental setups cannot distinguish between ‘mind readers’ and ‘behavior readers’, that results that seem to indicate ‘theory of mind’ may come from studies that are insufficiently controlled, and that our (...) own intuitive biases may lead us to interpret behavior more ‘cognitively’ than is necessary. The merits of each claim and suggested solution are weighed. The conclusion is that while it is true that existing setups cannot conclusively demonstrate ‘theory of mind’ in non-human animals, focusing on this fact is unlikely to be productive. Instead, the more interesting question is how sophisticated their social reasoning can be, whether it is about ‘unobservable inner experiences’ or not. Therefore, it is important to address concerns about the setup and interpretation of specific experiments. To alleviate the impact of intuitive biases, various strategies have been proposed in the literature. These include a deeper understanding of associative learning, a better knowledge of the limited ‘theory of mind’ humans actually use, and thinking of animal cognition in an embodied, embedded way; that is, being aware that constraints outside of the brain, and outside of the body, may naturally predispose individuals to produce behavior that looks smart without requiring complex cognition. To enable this kind of thinking, a powerful methodological tool is advocated: Computational modeling, namely agent-based modeling and, particularly, cognitive modeling. By explicitly simulating the rules and representations that underlie animal performance on specific tasks, it becomes much easier to look past one’s own biases and to see what cognitive processes might actually be occurring. (shrink)

Whether any non-human animal can attribute mental states to others remains the subject of extensive debate. This despite the fact that several species have behaved as if they have a ‘theory of mind’ in various behavioral tasks. In this paper, we review the reasons of skeptics for their doubts: That existing experimental setups cannot distinguish between ‘mind readers’ and ‘behavior readers’, that results that seem to indicate ‘theory of mind’ may come from studies that are insufficiently controlled, and that our (...) own intuitive biases may lead us to interpret behavior more ‘cognitively’ than is necessary. The merits of each claim and suggested solution are weighed. The conclusion is that while it is true that existing setups cannot conclusively demonstrate ‘theory of mind’ in non-human animals, focusing on this fact is unlikely to be productive. Instead, the more interesting question is how sophisticated their social reasoning can be, whether it is about ‘unobservable inner experiences’ or not. Therefore, it is important to address concerns about the setup and interpretation of specific experiments. To alleviate the impact of intuitive biases, various strategies have been proposed in the literature. These include a deeper understanding of associative learning, a better knowledge of the limited ‘theory of mind’ humans actually use, and thinking of animal cognition in an embodied, embedded way; that is, being aware that constraints outside of the brain, and outside of the body, may naturally predispose individuals to produce behavior that looks smart without requiring complex cognition. To enable this kind of thinking, a powerful methodological tool is advocated: Computational modeling, namely agent-based modeling and, particularly, cognitive modeling. By explicitly simulating the rules and representations that underlie animal performance on specific tasks, it becomes much easier to look past one’s own biases and to see what cognitive processes might actually be occurring. (shrink)

In recent studies of primates, the question has been raised whether competitive regimes are species-specific or should rather be considered as sex-specific. To study this problem we use an individual-oriented model called DomWorld in which artificial agents are equipped merely to group and compete. In former studies of this model, dominance style appeared to be strongly influenced by the intensity of aggression: by increasing only this intensity of aggression, a great number of the characteristics of an egalitarian society switched to (...) those of a despotic one. Here, we investigate, using DomWorld, a competitive regime of artificial males and females that differ exclusively in their fighting capacity; males having a higher intensity of aggression and a higher initial capacity of winning, such as may be due to a male-biased sexual dimorphism. Unexpectedly it appears that, in the model, even if the intensity of aggression of males is greater than that of females, their hierarchy is still significantly weaker and thus their society less differentiated and more egalitarian than that of females. The explanation is that, due to the higher initial dominance of males, single events of victory and defeat lead to less differentiation than among females. The greater the sexual difference in initial dominance between the sexes is the more egalitarian the males behave among themselves compared to the behaviour of the females among themselves. These effects are already visible during the initial phases of the hierarchical development. These results resemble findings among primates; in real primates their degree of sexual dimorphism may influence the competitive regime of each sex. (shrink)

In recent studies of primates, the question has been raised whether competitive regimes are species-specific or should rather be considered as sex-specific. To study this problem we use an individual-oriented model called DomWorld in which artificial agents are equipped merely to group and compete. In former studies of this model, dominance style appeared to be strongly influenced by the intensity of aggression: by increasing only this intensity of aggression, a great number of the characteristics of an egalitarian society switched to (...) those of a despotic one. Here, we investigate, using DomWorld, a competitive regime of artificial males and females that differ exclusively in their fighting capacity; males having a higher intensity of aggression and a higher initial capacity of winning, such as may be due to a male-biased sexual dimorphism. Unexpectedly it appears that, in the model, even if the intensity of aggression of males is greater than that of females, their hierarchy is still significantly weaker and thus their society less differentiated and more egalitarian than that of females. The explanation is that, due to the higher initial dominance of males, single events of victory and defeat lead to less differentiation than among females. The greater the sexual difference in initial dominance between the sexes is the more egalitarian the males behave among themselves compared to the behaviour of the females among themselves. These effects are already visible during the initial phases of the hierarchical development. These results resemble findings among primates; in real primates their degree of sexual dimorphism may influence the competitive regime of each sex. (shrink)